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Autonomy and the Second Person
Wthin: A Commentary on Stephen
Darwall's Tlie Second-Person Standpoints^
Christine M. Korsgaard
When you address a claim or a demand to someone, expecting him to
respond to that claim as one that gives him a reason for action, you are
attempting to issue what Stephen Darwall calls a second-personal reason.
Whether you succeed in doing so, according to Darwall, depends on
whether certain normative "felicity conditions" of making such a de-
mand are met. Since you expect the other person to take your demand
as giving him a reason, you are supposing that you have the authority
to bind him by your command. Since you expect him to take your
demand as giving him a reason, you are supposing that he can conform
to it in the way that one conforms to a reason—by acknowledging its
force and imposing it freely on himself, rather than, say, by being fright-
ened into obedience by the fear that you will retaliate if he does not.
You are assuming that he has what Darwall calls second-personal com-
petence, the competence to respond to a demand as a reason in the
right way. And for both of these reasons, you are also supposing that
he is accountable both to you and to himself if he does not conform
to the demand that you have made,
Darwall argues that because second-personal reasons have these
felicity conditions—the reciprocal authority of both parties, the com-
petence to respond to it, and the accountability that results—the very
act of addressing one entails certain recognizably moral commitments.
And this is important, because Darwall thinks that these felicity con-
* Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). References will be inserted into the
text using the abbreviation SPS.
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ditions hold for any attempt to give a genuinely second-personal reason,
not just for the issuing of moral demands. In issuing a demand that
you expect to be taken as a reason, you commit yourself to the idea
that you and the person on whom you make the demand share a nor-
mative point of view, from which both of you can see that your demand
constitutes a reason for someone in his place to act. Because that is the
form of a reason, you are commanding him not merely as, say, a soldier
under your military command, but as a person who happens to be a
soldier under your military command. To this extent you are committed
to viewing him as your equal, and as sharing in authority with you—
not the authority you have as his military commander, but the authority
of a fellow member of the moral community. For that is the shared
normative point of view from which you both can acknowledge that his
being a soldier under your military command is a reason for him to
obey you. And because you are committed to regarding him as an equal,
there are constraints on what you can reasonably command him to do.
For if he is to obey your command in the way that one conforms to a
reason, by acknowledging its authority and imposing it on himself, then
it must be reasonable for him to do that—in particular, it must be
consistent with his own authority and dignity as a free and rational being.
Of course this quick summary does not do justice to Darwall's com-
plex conception, but I hope it will give you the general idea. I think
that the idea of a second-personal reason is a genuine and important
advance in moral philosophy. In particular, it provides a way of articu-
lating what it means to say that you owe something to someone, as
opposed to just saying that you have a duty to treat him in a certain
way. For a duty to treat someone or something in a certain way is not
necessarily a duty owed to him, as our duties to care for the environment
or artistic treasures for which we happen to be responsible shows. And
it also throws light on one important reason why we cannot just pick
and choose those whom we are going to count as equals and as the
sources of moral claims. If we are to deal second-personally with others
in any way, making claims and demands on them and expecting them
to take those claims and demands as reasons, then, if Darwall is right,
we are committed to seeing those others as our equals in normative
authority and so as the sources of moral claims.'
1. I am tempted to say this is true if we talk to them at all, not as we might chatter
to a pet, but with an expectation that they will understand. For given the normativity of
meaning, talk is a kind of command—a command to think certain thoughts, although
not necessarily to credit them. (For this comparison see Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 136-42.)
Darwall resists the idea that his view shows that slavery involves "conceptual confusion
or some sort of pragmatic contradiction" (SPS, 265). That's right; it is a normative felicity
condition that is violated by addressing a command to a subject that one undertakes to10 Ethics October 2007
However, Darwall makes a further claim for the idea of second-
personal reasons and the moral commitments that they imply, namely
that second-personal reasons in a sense provide the foundation for moral
obligation, roughly as understood by Kant. I say "in a sense" because
Darwall's argument is modeled on Kant's argument for the foundation
of morality in the Critique of Practical Reason. And Kant argued there that
while freedom is the ratio essendi of morality—the reason for its exis-
tence—morality is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom—the way we know
that we are free {5:4n).^ As far as I know, Darwall does not explicitly
say, mimicking Kant, that "autonomy is the ratio essendi of second-per-
sonal competence, but second-personal competence is the ratio cognos-
cendi of autonomy," but he seems to have something like that in mind.
For he argues that our capacity for autonomous motivation is revealed
by—and is revealed only by—our capacity for second-personal trans-
actions of this kind. If that is right, then, strictly speaking, Darwall thinks,
like Kant, that autonomy or freedom is the foundation of morality. But
unlike Kant, he thinks that we cannot discover our freedom by any
reflection that proceeds simply from the first-person standpoint. Darwall
therefore opposes his view both to Kant's view, as Darwall himself un-
derstands it, and to my own version of Kantianism. These are the ar-
guments that I will address in these comments.
Darwall characterizes me both as someone who thinks all reasons
are second personal and also as someone who thinks that "moral ob-
ligations can be grounded in the constraints of first-personal delibera-
tion alone.'" That may sound paradoxical but it is basically right. What
makes this combination of views possible is that I think that the reflective
structure of self-consciousness inevitably places us in a relation of au-
thority over ourselves and that we are as a consequence also accountable
to ourselves."* By the reflective structure of self-consciousness, I mean
the fact that we are conscious of the potential grounds of our beliefs
treat as a mere object. But Darwall should not resist the idea that there is some sort of
confusion or contradiction here. If treating a subject as a mere means or an object is the
general form of immorality, then there is something especially perverse about both issuing
commands to your slaves and lying, for in both of these cases it is the subject's subjectivity
itself that is treated as a means.
2. References to Kant's ethical works are inserted into the text using the usual method
of citing the volume and page number of the standard German etHiiion oi Kants gesammelte
Schriflen (published by Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin). The editions of Kant's
ethical works I have used are those edited and translated by Mary Gregor for the Cambridge
Texts in the History of Philosophy Series: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Gam-
bridge; Gambridge University Press, 1997) and Critique of Practical Reason (Gambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997). For the Critique of Pure Reason I have used Norman
Kemp Smith's edition (Boston: St. Martin's Press, Macmillan, 1929), citing the pages of
the A and B editions as he does.
3. Both characterizations are on SPS, 11.
4. See Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, esp. 104-5 and 150-51.Korsgaard Autonomy and the Second Person Within 11
and actions as such. When I am conscious that I am tempted to do
something because of something else, I can ask myself whether I should
do that, and this amounts to asking whether the consideration on which
I propose to act provides a reason. To answer in the affirmative is to
adopt a certain maxim of action as a law governing my conduct; to
answer in the negative is to command myself to adopt a law of doing
the opposite—refraining from the forbidden action and, if necessary,
taking positive action to avoid the violation. Thus I act under my own
authority as a lawgiver, and I am accountable to myself if I do not. So
my reasons—and indeed practical reasons in general—are grounded in
the authority the human mind necessarily has over itself. We might put
this by saying that because of the refiective structure of human con-
sciousness, I think that every rational agent stands in what Darwall would
call a second-personal relation to herself—she has a second-personal
voice within.
I am happy to concede to Darwall that this cannot be the whole
story. As I mentioned earlier, this does not by itself get us to the idea
that I owe a certain kind of treatment to you. Instead it only gets us to
the idea that I owe it to myself to treat you in a certain way. We need
the second-personal reason for the latter conclusion. But as Darwall
himself emphasizes, Kant insists that the second-personal obligation
must always be accompanied by an obligation to myself. As Kant says,
"I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I
at the same time put myself under obligation" (6:417). Darwall quotes
that remark twice in his book, for it is essential to his argument {SPS,
23 n. 47, 248 n. 9), For when I address a demand to you, I know that
you can accept the claim that you are under an obligation to me only
insofar as you can put yourself under an obligation to yourself to do
what I demand. And it is precisely this fact that forces me to concede
that you have the same kind of autonomy and dignity that I do and to
constrain my demands accordingly.
Since in order to address a second-personal reason to you, and so
to obligate you, I have to assume that you have the capacity to obligate
yourself, it would be natural to suppose that the capacity to obligate
oneself is the prior notion. But this is not Darwall's view—at least, not
so far as epistemic priority, the ratio cognoscendi, is concerned. For he
thinks it is only in our responsiveness to second-personal reasons that
we discover the capacity to obligate ourselves. So the question is why
he thinks that and whether he is right.
Darwall mounts his argument on what he takes to be the defects
in Kant's arguments. So examining this question is going to take us into
some of the murkiest and most contested parts of the Kantian corpus:
the two different arguments that Kant gives for the foundation of mo-
rality in the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals12 Ethics October 2007
and in the Critique of Practical Reason and the question why Kant aban-
doned the former in favor of the latter. I will try to be brief.
In the Groundwork, Kant first establishes that a free will would be
an autonomous will, and that an autonomous will would be a moral
will—that is, a will under moral law. A free will is one that operates
independently of alien causes. This is negative freedom. However since
the will is a kind of causality, it must operate in accordance with some
law or other. Since the will must operate in accordance with a law, and
it cannot be a law alien to itself, it must operate in accordance with its
own law—a law it imposes on itself. That makes it autonomous, or
positively free. And an autonomous will must be a moral will because
the moral law, in its universal law formulation, is simply the law of
autonomy: it tells us to act on a law we impose on ourselves (4:446-47).
Having established these connections, Kant next argues that we must
act "under the idea of freedom" (4:447-48). His point concerns the
implications of self-consciousness that I mentioned earlier: we act under
our own authority and therefore cannot allow ourselves to be directed
by alien causes. Since we act under the idea of freedom, Kant proposes,
the laws of the free will, moral laws, apply to us. But then Kant raises
a worry: to suppose that we are capable of "taking an interest" in an
action—that is, of being motivated to do it for its own sake, because we
legislate it to ourselves—just is to suppose that we are autonomous. So
Kant worries that the inference from negative freedom to positive free-
dom does not go through; the argument assumes what it is supposed
to prove, namely, that we are autonomous (4:448-50). In the Groundwork,
Kant replies to the worry with a story about the two standpoints we can
take on ourselves and our actions (4:450-54). It will not be necessary
for us to go into that part of the story here, as Darwall's objections do
not concern it.
Darwall's objections to Kant's arguments center on the idea that if
Kant's argument is to establish the Categorical Imperative as the moral
law, Kant must be able to rule out other theories of practical reason,
and the conceptions of agency associated with those theories, as some-
how incompatible with first-person deliberation.^ To show that this is
impossible, Darwall sets before us a character he calls the naive practical
reasoner (SPS, 31, 216-17). The naive practical reasoner desires certain
things for his own sake, and he thinks there are reasons to achieve or
5, I do not entirely agree with this. If we could give an otherwise adequate account
of practical reason without taking on the commitments of suhstantive realism ahout rea-
sons, we would not need to argue against suhstantive realism over and above doing that.
This is because the only reason for accepting the commitments of substantive realism is
the worry that we cannot give an adequate account of practical reason without them, I
do agree that the Kantian must accept the burden of showing that her account yields a
superior conception of agency, however.Korsgaard Autonomy and the Second Person Within 13
promote those things. He does not take his desires themselves to be
reasons but rather regards his desires as epistemic states, which provide
him with perceptions of the values of objects and states of affairs. He
acts on the reasons that he sees as arising from those values: as Darwall
calls them, state-of-the-world-regarding, agent-neutral, reasons. Al-
though Darwall rejects this picture of practical reason, he does think
that there are reasons of the kind the naive practical reasoner operates
with. So Darwall thinks that the conception of agency associated with
the naive practical reasoner is perfecdy intelligible. But the naive prac-
tical reasoner is responsive to reasons in the same way that Darwall
thinks a theoretical reasoner is, whereas Darwall thinks that the kind
of autonomy that Kant associates with practical reason must amount to
more than that. After all, Kant thinks that the autonomous will is an
independent source of reasons—or, to put it another way, that the Cat-
egorical Imperative generates substantive conclusions about what we
ought to do. Whereas the norms of theoretical reason, according to
Darwall, are norms of consistency and coherence, which rule out certain
combinations of beliefs, but do not rule in any beliefs in particular {SPS,
215).'^
Let us now consider how Darwall turns these considerations
against the argument of the Groundwork. Kant says that a negatively
free will is not directed by alien causes. Darwall replies that if we
interpret "alien causes" as causes that might interfere with one's pro-
cesses of reasoning, this is true, but it does not establish that the will
is an independent source of reasons in the way that is required by
Kant's argument {SPS, 224-29). In general, Darwall understands neg-
ative freedom as non-interference with the processes of reasoning, and
positive freedom as the capacity to follow rational norms. These forms
of freedom, he argues, are common to theoretical and practical reason,
and do not establish that we must regard ourselves as having auton-
omous wills in the special sense required by Kant's conception of
practical reason. For having these forms of freedom is compatible with
acting on principles other than the Categorical Imperative, or on rea-
sons that are not derived from the Categorical Imperative, like the
reasons of the naive practical reasoner.
I think there are three things wrong here. The first is that Darwall
is looking for the difference between theoretical and practical reason
in the wrong place. For Kant, reason in all of its departments is legis-
6. This cannot strictly be correct, since theoretical reason in Darwall's sense will rule
in beliefs like "X, Y, and Z cannot all be true." But perhaps these are not beliefs "about
the world" in the sense Darwall has in mind.14 Ethics October 2007
lative.^ The principles of the understanding, being synthetic, are sub-
stantive, and they do rule certain beliefs in or out. For instance, the
principle that every event has a cause rules in every particular belief of
the form "this event must have had a cause" and rules out every par-
ticular belief to the contrary.
The second thing I would object to—although obviously this is too
long a discussion for the present occasion—is the coherence of the idea
of the state-of-the-world-regarding reason. This is because I think that
the normativity of reason just is the normativity derived from the mind's
authority over itself—^where that includes the authority we have over
each other. State-of-the-world-regarding reasons as Darwall conceives
them do not seem to get their authority from the mind—rather, they
seem to have authority over the mind. Where then does their authority
come from? Darwall rightly rejects Moore's idea that there is simply a
way the world "ought to be" because, as he says, "only what can be
normatively guided can be subject to oughts" {SPS, 286). Darwall pro-
poses instead that we interpret such claims as asserting that certain
valuing attitudes toward the state of affairs in question are warranted.
For instance, to say that a certain state of affairs "ought to be" is to say
that it is desirable or worth bringing about—that desiring it is warranted.
Darwall then proposes that, "if we . . . (. . . assume that, as a conceptual
matter, being desirable or worth bringing about makes a normative claim
on action), then it will follow from the fact that an outcome is valuable
that there is some reason for the agent to realize it" {SPS, 286). Ap-
parently Darwall's idea is that bringing in the attitude gives us something
that can be normatively guided.** One worry about this move is that
7. Logic for Kant gives laws to thinking, and thinking can be either theoretical or
practical, so there is nothing specifically "theoretical" about norms of coherence and
consistency. And theoretical reason, according to Kant, also makes its own unconditional
demands on the world. It demands that the world be a realm of causally interacting objects,
and it also demands that the world conform to the teleological principles of speculative
metaphysics: that it be a realm of free agents ordered to the good under the government
of a creator who guarantees that ordering. But only the world of appearances meets the
first demand, and the world does not, or cannot be known to, meet the teleological demand
at all. Practical reason, Kant thinks, provides us with the materials to give positive content
to the demands of speculative metaphysics. This fact provides what Kant calls, in the second
Critique, a "credential" for the moral law (5:48), which he thinks takes the place of the
deduction. Practical reason also succeeds in imposing its unconditional demand on one
thing in the world, the will: that is the doctrine of the Fact of Reason, discussed in the
text below. That, according to Kant, is the difference between practical and theoretical
reason.
8. One may also have doubts about whether attitudes can be normatively guided.
This is not to deny that attitudes may be, in Scanlon's sense, judgment sensitive (T. M.
Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press], 20-22).
But the kind of influence reason has on attitudes is clearly quite different from the kind
it has on actions: one does not have an attitude "for a reason" or as a result of havingKorsgaard Autonomy and the Second Person Within 15
unless seeing something as "worth bringing about" means something
other than seeing it as something that there is some reason to bring
about, inserting a warranted attitude into the story does not seem to
be doing much real work. But another worry is just what this quite
different kind of normativity, which is not grounded in the mind's au-
thority over itself, is supposed to be. Perhaps it is just undue theoretical
tidiness that makes me think a unified theory of normativity would be
preferable.
The third and most important problem is that Darwall's concep-
tions of negative and positive freedom do not do justice to Kant's ar-
gument. Negative freedom is not just a matter of not being derailed by
causes interfering with the process of reasoning. I think Kant's view is
that the rational mind is by its very nature under its own authority, and
a will that simply accepted the authority of state-of-the-world-regarding
reasons would be governed by something alien to itself. It would be, in
Kant's words, "consciously receiving direction from any other quarter"—
something Kant says that reason cannot do (4:448).^ Now Darwall in-
dicates that he agrees with Kant that, quoting Danvall, "rational action
involves not just beliefs and desires, but also some norm or principle
the agent accepts and implicitly makes her own in acting on it" {SPS,
225).
I think Darwall mentions the fact that the agent makes the principle
taken something as a reason for the attitude. Of course we do say things like "you ought
not to be afraid." But vjfhen we then go on to spell out the reasons why you ought not to
be afraid, we do not expect you to draw the conclusion that you ought not to be afraid
and as a result stop being afraid. Rather, we hope the reasons themselves will operate on
your fear directly. Your agency is not involved in the same way as it is in acting for a reason.
9. Darwall argues that this idea—that reason must not accept direction from outside—
also applies equally to theoretical and practical reason, and so does not explain the dis-
tinctive sense in which practical reason is autonomous. As I have already suggested (see
n. 7), I think Darwall is looking for the difference in the wrong place. Darwall will want
to argue that if we insist on taking negative and positive freedom in a stronger sense than
the very weak sense he proposes here, it will seem mysterious that our beliefs have to
conform to the evidence of our senses—because that will now seem to violate the principle
that reason must not be directed from outside. I think that part of the difficulty is that
Kant thinks the achievement of understanding, not the truth of belief, is the enterprise
of theoretical reason. And part of the difficulty is that although Kant would agree that
we are trying to conceptualize the world that is "there anyway" (as Darwall likes to say),
for him that does not mean that our conception is supposed to "match" the world that
is there anyway. Of course our beliefs must be true—they are responsible to the world
that is there anyway—and this is part of the difference between theoretical and practical
reason. But the difference is rather subtle. We can reject an apparent "perception" that
does not fit our best scientific understanding of the world, just as we can reject a desire
that is ruled out by the Gategorical Imperative as not providing any reason to act. But in
the first case, we seem to need an explanation of why the mental state in question seemed
to be a perception, or why the perception was misleading, whereas we do not seem to
need anything further in order to dismiss the outlaw desire, at least for practical purposes.16 Ethics October 2007
"her own" because he thinks that is sufficient to relieve her of the charge
of being directed from outside. And Darwall also agrees that, "for in-
telligent pursuit of an outcome I desire to involve my will, I must de-
liberate on the basis of some rational norm, one I take to apply validly
to any possible rational agent. And I must presuppose that I am bound
by such norms as a condition of the intelligibility of my own deliberation"
{SPS, 225). But he argues that this does not require autonomy, because
it does not require that the norm in question be the Categorical Im-
perative: it could just as well be the kind of norm that the naive practical
reasoner accepts—a consequentialist norm instructing him to act on
state-of-the-world-regarding reasons.
In fact this is a theme that comes up again in Darwall's criticism
of Kant's argument in the second Critique, so before I respond to it, let
me take that argument up. By the time he writes the second Critique,
Kant has decided that "the moral law cannot be proved by any deduc-
tion" but also that it does not need a deduction, since it is "firmly
established of itself" (5:47), Kant now reverses the argument, arguing
from morality to freedom rather than from freedom to morality. The
argument begins by establishing that "consciousness of the moral law"
is what Kant calls a Fact of Reason. To explain what he means, Kant
presents us with a pair of examples. In the first, a man claims that his
lust is irresistible if the occasion offers him a chance to satisfy it. We
then erect a gallows in front of the house where this opportunity occurs,
promise to hang him if he gives way to his lust, and ask him if he can
resist it now. Presumably he can. Although there are various ways to
take Kant's point, Darwall supposes—and I agree—that the point is
simply that the man's desire for self-preservation will outweigh his sup-
posedly irresistible lust.'" In the second example, a man is threatened
with the gallows if he refuses to give false testimony against an honorable
man whom his prince wishes to destroy on a plausible pretext. Would
10, According to another way to read the story, this first example already shows that
the man is free in a sense—he can resist his inclination when prudence demands it.
Prudence is one sort of command of reason, and we can follow it, so we must be free.
That Kant did hold an idea like this at one point we know, from some remarks he makes
in the Critique of Pure Reason, in the Canon of Pure Reason, There Kant said that we can
know what he calls "practical freedom" through experience, because "the human will is
not determined , , , by that , , , which , , , immediately affects the senses; we have the
power to overcome the impressions on our faculty of sensuous desire, by calling up rep-
resentations of what, in a more indirect manner, is useful or injurious" (A802/B830), One
might take this example as illustrating that point—the man displays practical freedom in
being moved by a representation of the injurious—gratifying his lust will be injurious if
he is hanged for it, I do not think this is the right way to read the passage in the second
Critique, since Kant is clear in the second Critique that we learn about our freedom from
morality. But it would be possible to argue that Kant intends to be using the pair of
examples to be arguing from practical freedom to transcendental freedom.Korsgaard Autonomy and the Second Person Within 17
his love of life—now established as his strongest desire—make it im-
possible for him to refuse? Kant says that perhaps you would not venture
to say whether you would refuse but that anyone "must admit without
hesitation that it would be possible for him." And Kant concludes: "He
judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is aware that
he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, without the
moral law, would have remained unknown to him" (5:30).
Darwall accepts the argument, although not Kant's assertion that
it leads to a cognition of freedom. This is because he accepts it for what
I think is the wrong reason. He says: "The point seems to follow from
the nature of a deliberative (normative) practical judgment. Were he
to suppose his desire for self-preservation to be literally irresistible, he
would be forced, in reasoning practically in light of that, to conclude
he should do something else" {SPS, 236). In other words, the person
making the judgment cannot decide to do what he knows to be im-
possible. Darwall goes on to complain that this point does nothing to
establish the Categorical Imperative as the exemplar's principle. A Ross-
ian deontologist, he says, could accept the argument that whatever a
person morally ought to do must be something that she can do. But
Darwall argues there is no reason for him to accept the Categorical
Imperative on that basis or to accept the idea that something like the
Categorical Imperative underlies the duties he does accept {SPS, 239).
But Kant's point is not that whatever a person ought to do must
be something that she can do. Kant's point is that in the first person
deliberative situation, we know that we can be motivated to do what we
believe we ought to do. The "can" here is not, as Darwall says, "that of
an open deliberative alternative"; rather, it is something like "can bring
myself to."" For it is this—the capacity to be motivated by whatever law
we give to ourselves, positive freedom—that Kant was worried we might
be illicitly presupposing in the "deduction" of morality from freedom
in the Groundwork. Kant has now decided that we do not have to prove
that we can be motivated by the moral law, since each of us in the
deliberative perspective knows perfectly well that she can be.
Darwall assumes that the Fact of Reason argument is supposed to
lead us to a formulation of the Categorical Imperative. And he wonders
how it can do that, since a Rossian deontologist must also agree that
he can do what he ought. But the Fact of Reason argument by itself
does not have to lead us to a formulation of the Categorical Imperative.
For in the second section of the Groundwork, Kant has argued that we
11, Kant is using the German version of "ought implies can," not the English version.
In the English version, the fact that I cannot A is used to rule out the claim that I ought
to A, In the German version, the fact that I ought to A is used to rule in the claim that
I can.18 Ethics October 2007
can derive the universal law formulation of the Categorical Imperative
analytically from the very idea of a categorical imperative. To put that
more clearly, he thinks that the Categorical Imperative can be derived
from the very idea of a principle that commands unconditionally. Kant
says: "When I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it
contains. For since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the
necessity that the maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law
contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left with
which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of a law
as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly rep-
resents as necessary" (4:420-21). What Kant is saying is this: a categorical
imperative is a law, to which our maxims must conform. But the reason
they must do so cannot be that there is some further condition they
must meet or some other law to which they must conform. For instance,
suppose someone proposed that one must keep one's promises because
it is the will of God that one should do so—the law would then "contain
the condition" that our maxims should conform to the will of God. This
would yield only a condidonal requirement to keep your promises—if
you would obey the will of God, then you must keep your promises—
whereas the Categorical Imperative must give us an unconditional re-
quirement. Since there can be no such condition, all that remains is
that the Categorical Imperative should tell us that our maxims them-
selves must be laws—that is, that they must be universal, that being the
characteristic of laws.
There is a simpler way to make this point. What could make it true
that we must keep our promises because it is the will of God? That would
be true only if it were true that we must indeed obey the will of God,
that is, if "obey the will of God" were itself a categorical imperative.
Conditional requirements give rise to a regress; if there are uncondi-
tional requirements, we must at some point arrive at principles on which
we are required to act, not because we are commanded to do so by
some yet higher law, but because they are laws in themselves, laws by
virtue of their own nature. The Categorical Imperative, in the most
general sense, tells us to act on those principles, principles that are
themselves laws.'^ Kant takes it that this means they will be laws by virtue
of their form.
Versions of this argument occur in many places in Kant's ethical
writings. The argument of Groundwork I is a version of this argument,
as are the arguments that occur both before and after the presentation
of the Fact of Reason example in the Gritique of Practical Reason. In all
12. The last two paragraphs are lifted from my introduction to Rant's Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy edition
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cases, the basic argument is that an unconditional obligation cannot be
characterized by its content alone. Kant believes that when a law is
characterized only as having a certain kind of content, what binds us
to conform to that law could only be some empirical condition—for
instance that we simply like acting in the way the law prescribes, like
the sympathetic man of Groundwork I, or, supposing that the laws are
divine commandments, that we fear divine punishment. In these cases
we are not unconditionally bound. An unconditional law must therefore
be characterized by universal form rather than by its content: it must
be the kind of thing that you find you must will as a universal law.
The importance of that argument for our purposes lies in this: in
connection with the Groundwork argument, Darwall claims that someone
who acts on a consequentialist norm can meet the Kantian requirement
that reason should not be directed from outside, so long as she thinks
that the consequentialist norm validly applies to any possible rational
agent, and so long as she adopts this norm as her own. And in con-
nection with the Fact of Reason argument, Darwall argues that a Rossian
deontologist can accept the Fact of Reason argument without thinking
that he is committed to the Categorical Imperative, or to the idea that
something like the Categorical Imperative underlies the requirements
he does accept. But if Kant is right in arguing that the Categorical
Imperative can be derived from the very idea of an unconditional re-
quirement, then both of these agents are committed to the Categorical
Imperative. For they are committed to thinking that the norms they act
on are unconditional rational requirements.'^ They must therefore think
that the principles they propose to follow are the kinds of principles
that the Categorical Imperative picks out as unconditionally binding—
principles which must be willed as universal laws. Combined with the
Fact of Reason, this commits them to being bound by the Categorical
Imperative. In other words, Kant's argument, if it works, sets the terms
of the debate about which theory of practical reason is correct: the
consequentialist and the Rossian deontologist must show that their prin-
ciples are ones that must be willed as universal laws.'"*
I have not said all this just for the sake of disagreeing with Darwall's
assessments of Kant's arguments. Rather, I am interested in the effect
13. The Rossian intuitionist is an awkward example for my point, since he accepts a
bunch of different norms, each of which is conditional upon the implications of the others
in any given case. But presumably the Rossian intuitionist thinks his deliberative conclusion
expresses an unconditional reqtiirement, and that is enough for purposes of the argument:
he thinks it is a categorical imperative.
14. A parallel move is made later, by John Rawls, when he proposes that any proposed
principles of justice must be tested by constructing the original position in which it would
be chosen, and seeing whether its assumptions are plausible; see A Theory of Justice, 2nd
ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 102-5, 130-68.20 Ethics October 2007
Darwall's objections to Kant's arguments might have on his own argu-
ments. Following Kant, I have been arguing that autonomy, giving laws
to ourselves, is an essential feature of the first-person deliberative stand-
point. I have suggested that if Kant is right about the nature of action,
an agent cannot merely follow some principle other than the Categorical
Imperative: rather, she must judge that any principle she follows con-
forms to the Categorical Imperative. I think Darwall's denial of this
creates problems for his own argument.
We can see this by asking whether some of the moves that Darwall
makes against Kant can be turned against his own argument. Darwall
thinks that an agent can realize both negative and positive freedom
while acting in accordance with principles other than the Categorical
Imperative, for instance by taking up some consequentialist principle
and "making it her OV\TI." If SO, how does the fact that we hold someone
responsible for freely determining herself to respond to our second-
personal demands tend to show that we must accept something like the
Categorical Imperative? Why aren't negative and positive freedom in
Darwall's reductive senses sufficient for the kind of free self-determi-
nation involved in second-personal competence? Suppose the com-
mander and the soldier are naive second-personal transagents, who both
believe that there is a state-of-the-world-regarding reason for inferiors
to obey superiors. Rank, they think, warrants an attitude of submission
on the part of the soldier, and this translates into a reason to obey.
Darwall may want to argue that state-of-the-world-regarding reasons do
not in general entitle us to make demands on each other—that is, in
general we cannot demand that people do things just because those
things are good. We may reply that what warrants the demand in this
particular case is simply the content of the state-of-the-world-regarding
reason at hand: the content is that the fact of rank warrants command,
submission, and accountability. Nonmoral second-personal demands
usually involve established authority relations, and if this kind of move
could be made in the case of all second-personal demands except the
ones that are already explicitly moral, then how are the presuppositions
of second-personal address supposed to provide us with a bridge into
moral territory?
The other problem that arises from Darwall's rejection of Kant's
arguments concerns the apparently optional character of the second-
person standpoint. Suppose someone does not hold herself or anyone
else responsible for meeting demands, or resent it when they do not?
In chapter 6, Darwall notes that it is a natural response to his argument
to agree with him about the presuppositions of second-personal address
but then to "deny that second-personal address, so understood, is any-
thing we need have much of a stake in" {SPS, 138). Darwall goes on to
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garding people second-personally, citing the fact that even Stalin went
in for resentment and rationalization as evidence of this pressure {SPS,
138-40). But he concedes that these pressures do not show that there
is any incoherence in avoiding second-personal address. And he also
concedes that citing the psychological difficulty of avoiding resentment
and other such phenomena does not quite answer "the philosophical
question . . . whether we should see things in this way" {SPS, 278). But
if we do not have to enter the second-person standpoint, why must we
have second-personal reasons at all?
At the beginning of chapter 11, Darwall appears to be about to
address this problem. He says: "Even if taking up the second-person
stance commits us to equal dignity and autonomy, that is consistent with
it and its associated commitments being no more than rationally op-
tional" {SPS, 277). And he says that he is going to respond to this worry
by arguing that "the second person standpoint gives us a perspective
on our own agency that enables us to appreciate a fundamental differ-
ence between theoretical and practical reason and so improves our grasp
of reasons for acting" {SPS, 277),
But, we may wonder, does someone who does not engage in second-
personal address fail to see reasons that she has, or only reasons that
she might have had if she had engaged in second-personal address?
Darwall certainly suggests that she fails to see reasons that she has. He
says: "Were someone somehow to avoid taking [the second-person stand-
point] up ... she would fail to appreciate what we, who have taken it
up, can validate as reasons from a more comprehensive view that in-
cludes it" {SPS, 277),'^
And he also says elsewhere that "not even universal disrespect can
destroy the dignity of free and rational persons, , . , Equal dignity is
nothing anyone can bestow, so neither is it anything any person can
15, The formulation here, which suggests that second-personal reasons are real be-
cause we can validate them by viewing them from a more objective standpoint, recalls
Thomas Nagel's views about the role of assuming more objective standpoints in The View
from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), I think this is no accident. In
fact, I think we can usefully see Darwall's book in general as presenting us with a variant
of Nagel's argument in his first book, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1970), Nagel argued that we can capture the essence of moral reasons
if we think about how a certain familiar form of moral argument is supposed to work.
When we ask "how would you like it if someone did that to you?" Nagel proposed, we
invite the agent to view himself and his victim as interchangeably situated "someones,"
and to conclude that doing that to any "someone" is objectionable. In a similar way,
Darwall's argument invites us to view ourselves and others as interchangeably situated
"yous" and to conclude that doing certain things to anyone with whom we stand in a "I-
thou" relationship is objectionable. Although Darwall doesn't make this comparison ex-
plicitly, he does draw a contrast between his own view and Nagel's along these lines at
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remove through disrespect" (SPS, 144), So presumably Darwall does
think that anyone who failed to take up the second-person standpoint
would fail to see reasons that they have anyway, reasons for according
dignity to every rational being.
In the body of the chapter 11 discussion, Darwall distinguishes the
formal aims of action and belief from their substantive aims. The formal
aim of belief is to believe whatever there is reason to believe; the sub-
stantive aim is to believe what is true. The formal aim of action is to do
whatever there is reason to do. The naive practical reasoner, Darwall
goes on to argue, supposes that the substantive aim of action is to bring
about valuable states of the world. If that were true, Darwall claims, "it
would be psychologically impossible to decide, intend, or do something
on any other grounds" {SPS, 287). When we grasp the existence of
second-personal reasons, Darwall says that "we see that what seemed to
be true from a naive practical standpoint, that action has the substantive
aim of bringing about valuable outcomes, is an illusion" {SPS, 290).
What then is the substantive aim of action, according to Darwall? Oddly,
the question comes up again only in a footnote to a passage in which
Darwall is explaining why second-personal reasons can fit into a con-
structivist framework. Though I am unable to reconstruct Darwall's rea-
soning here, he canvasses two conclusions, that action has no substantive
aim, or that the substantive aim of action is autonomy {SPS, 295 n. 30).
But if the latter is true, how is the naive practical reasoner psychologically
possible?"' According to Darwall, he does not aim at autonomy when
he acts on his naive reasons. And if part of the lesson we learn when
we take up the second-person standpoint is that the naive practical
reasoner is not possible after all, how can the claim that he is possible
be used in the argument against Kant?
I do not wish to rest too much weight on that particular argument,
which, after all, only appears in a footnote. My worry here can be put
in more general terms. On Darwall's account, the second-person stand-
point does not seem to be unavoidable, the way the standpoint of first-
personal deliberation is. If we are autonomous, then the person who
declines to take up the second-person standpoint fails to know some-
thing intimate and important about his own agency. But unless he has
a reason to take up the second-person standpoint and its presupposi-
tions, it is possible that he will never know. And that conclusion can be
generalized: if it were not for the fact that it is so psychologically difficult
to avoid holding one another accountable, it seems as if we might never
16, Kant's argument that anyone who accepts an unconditional requirement is in
effect accepting the Categorical Imperative amounts to an argument that it is psycholog-
ically impossihle to respond to an unconditional demand without responding to the Cat-
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have discovered that we are autonomous. But then how could we ever
have been autonomous? And how do we go about "presupposing" the
autonomy of others in second-personal address, if we have no indepen-
dent access to this feature of human agency?
On Kant's account as I understand it, by contrast, the second-person
standpoint is unavoidable, because I do not have to discover, by making
and responding to demands on others, that I am answerable to myself.
That fact is made clear to me by the voice of the second person within.